Issue #3521
closed
last_override_config exposes sensitive info
Description
Importers and distributors have a "last_override_config" object which is exposed via the API.
In several cases, secrets are passed into override_config when triggering a task. For example, in yum importer there's ssl_client_key and in docker importer there's basic_auth_password. If these config items are given, they're stored in last_override_config and then become readable to all users with read access on the distributor/importer.
This makes usage of those config items quite dangerous as one can't pass these secrets into the API for a sync without also considering which users have read access on the objects, and whether it's OK to expose the secret to those users. Or more likely, one would fail to consider this, and thus would build tools/workflows which expose the secrets without realizing it.
That latter scenario is exactly what I'm faced with now, because it has always been established procedure that our Pulp installations internally have widely shared read-only accounts, allowing everyone to freely data mine / build applications on top of our Pulp without administrative hassle. Due to realization of this issue, that's now under threat and we may be forced to make the system less convenient.
Solution:
- Keep the secrets in the DB but don't render them in the API
Related issues
.
Redact last_override_config
This commit resolvs CVE-2018-1090 by redacting all data from last_override_config. It does not modify what is saved in the database. It also adds a release note for the 2.16.2 release.
https://pulp.plan.io/issues/3521 closes #3521